Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1970

Real Property
Roger Bernhardt
Golden Gate University School of Law, rbernhardt@ggu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
1970 Cal Law 389

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.

Real Property
by Roger Bernhardt*

I. Introduction
II. Third·Party Tort Liability
A. Parties Plaintiff
B. Theory of Liability
C. Measure of Damages
D. Parties Defendant
III. Brokers and their Commissions
A. Listings
B. Deposit Receipts
* A.B. 1955; A.M. 1957; J.D. 1960,
University of Chicago. Associate Professor, Golden Gate College School of
Law. Member, California Bar. Author and lecturer on Real Estate for
California Continuing Education of the
Bar.
CAL LAW 1970

The author
to Lee-Louise
Gate College,
assistance in
article.

extends his appreciation
Priest, student at Golden
School of Law, for her
the preparation of this

389

Real Property

IV. Landlord and Tenant
A. Repairs
B. Forcible Entry

I. Introduction
"Real property" as a topic exists only in a law professor's
mind. Practicing attorneys may specialize in representing
title companies or developers or brokers or any of the other
entrepreneurs who make their living in one way or another
from real estate, but none of these lawyers would claim that
his proper field of expertise is real estate per se. Consequently, any article on developments in the field of real property
law really becomes a series of separate articles on developments in some real estate specialties, rather than a cohesive
whole. I have tried, here, to cover the three specialties which
have undergone the greatest growth during 1969, and that
may be of some interest to those who do not devote their entire
time to these matters.

II. Third·Party Tort Liability
Suppose that while John Doe is visiting some friends in their
home he is scalded when he turns on the hot water tap. He
can show that the hot water system is defective, but can demonstrate no actual negligence in construction. Furthermore,
the contractor who built the home has since gone out of business. Has he any chance of prevailing in an action against
a savings and loan institution that made the original construction loan on the house? In 1968, no real estate lawyer
would have taken the case (although a personal injury attorney would have seriously thought about it); in 1969, it
would have looked like a beautiful case to any attorney; and,
in 1970, the case has become doubtful again.
The reason that the case would have looked unpromising
in 1968 was that it fell short of traditional real estate notions
of liability in four respects: (1) Doe was not the owner or
possessor of the premises, (2) he could not prove negligence,
390
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(3) he was seeking personal injury relief rather than property
damage, (4) he was not suing a party who "caused" the condition.
By 1969, each of these limitations standing in the way of
recovery was discarded or at least weakened. Ultimately a
new roadblock to recovery was thrown up by the legislature,
but the judicial development that preceded it should first be
described.
A. Parties Plaintiff
Until 1958, no one other than the direct purchaser of a
house could recover from a contractor for negligent construction after the purchaser had accepted the completed house
unless the premises were inherently dangerous. l Then in Dow
v. Holly Mfg. CO.,2 the State Supreme Court rejected this
"completed and accepted" defense, and held that a remote
purchaser could recover without privity. Three years later,
in Stewart v. COX,3 the State Supreme Court informed the
legal profession that under the tests of Biakanja v. Irving,4
privity was not required in actions concerning the real estate
construction field.
But in both of the cases just mentioned, the plaintiffs were
either tenants or owners of the property. Whether a nonpossessing, nonowning visitor could recover was not settled. 5
In 1969, the State Supreme Court decided Elmore v. American Motors Corp.6 where a defect in a Rambler station wagon
caused it to fishtail and cross over in front of an oncoming
vehicle, killing the driver of the oncoming car. Strict liability
had been applied long enough in the chattel field to make it
1. See Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal.2d
228, 201 P.2d 1, 13 A.L.R.2d 183
(1948).
2. 49 Ca1.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736
(1958).
3. 55 Cal.2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521,
362 P.2d 345 (1961).
4. 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d \6, 65
A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958).
CAL LAW 1970

5. Except in the case where the contractor was still working on the premises. See Chance v. Lawry's Inc., 58
Cal. 2d 368, 24 Cal. Rptr. 209, 374
P .2d 185 (1962).
6. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652,
451 P.2d 84 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see Moreau, TORTS,
in this volume.
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certain that the owner of the Rambler could recover from the
manufacturer or retailer, but the question of whether "bystanders" could also recover was novel. The Court held that
they could:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater pro-

tection than the consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their purchases to articles
manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by
reputable retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily
has no such opportunities. In short, the bystander is
in greater need of protection from defective products
which are dangerous, and if any distinction should be
made between bystanders and users, it should be made,
contrary to the position of defendants, to extend greater
liability in favor of the bystanders. 7
.Is the analogy between the pedestrian or oncoming motorist and the visitor on the premises sufficiently close to permit
Elmore to work in the real estate field? The practical ability
of the casual visitor to check out the plumbing of his host's
house before washing his hands seems less real than for a
pedestrian to watch oncoming cars. And earlier, in Dow v.
Holly Mfg. Co. s the State Supreme Court indicated that there
is a substantial similarity between contractors and automobile' manufacturers:
There is also a close analogy between a supplier of chattels and a general contractor for the construction of a
building. The contractor supplies all of the materials
used as well as the labor either by fabricating it himself,
buying it from another or having an independent subconstructor do the same thing. The owner in effect buys
a properly completed building from the contractor which
the contractor is bound to supply. In the case of the
supplier of chattels when he supplies the goods it is im7. 70 Ca1.2d 578 at 586-587, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 at 657, 451 P.2d 84 at 89.
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8. 49 Ca1.2d 720, 321
(1958).

P.2d 736

CAL LAW 1970

Real Property

material to his liability that he may have had another
supply the product; he is nevertheless liable because he
has vouched for the chattels as his own by taking the contract. The same is true of a house where he supplies
many parts, as well as labor, most of which are probably
not fabricated by him but by independent contractors
or sellers. In such case the supplier is liable to third
persons for negligence. 9
Until 1969, it could have been argued that the affording
of protection to non possessors of chattels had no bearing on
the protection to be given to nonpossessors of land, because
of the historical rules making a nonpossessor's rights dependent on whether he was an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. But
with the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Rowland v.
Christian, abolishing these distinctions and making negligence the test in all cases, the analogy between personal and
real property becomes difficult to resist. Rowland, even more
than Elmore, shows that persons injured on land need not
own or possess the land in order to recover. Rowland, alone,
permits the invitee to recover from the possessor for negligence. But when Rowland is combined with Elmore and
the mentioned contractor cases, it is also probable that the
invitee can recover from whoever causes the dangerous condition of the premises leading to the injury, whether or not
that person is the owner of the property.
l{)

B. Theory of Liability

Can such a plaintiff prevail only if he is able to show negligence, or may he rely on a theory of strict liability? Under
the doctrine of strict liability, a person injured by use of a
product may recover without showing that the manufacturer was guilty of negligence in its production, if the injured
party can show it was defective and the manufacturer did not
expect the injured party to inspect the product for defects.ll
9. 49 Cal.2d 720, 726, 321 P.2d 736,
739-740.
10. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968). For a full discusCAL LAW 1970

sion of this case see Moreau, TORTS,
Cal Law-Trends and Developments
1969, p. 493.
11. See Greenman v. Yuba Power
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Between 1953 and 1968, strict liability was applied to almost every kind of tangible asset except land and houses.
They were held not included because there is no warranty of
fitness enumerated in section 1113 of the Civil Code, which
was deemed to afford the sale basis for protecting purchasers. 1s
The big breakthrough of strict liability into real estate
happened in 1969. After one false start,t3 the Court of Appeal, in Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.14 held that a contractor could be strictly liable in tort to a remote purchaser for
property damage resulting from a defective heating system
that reduced the value of the property by over $5,000. The
contrary arguments which had earlier pursuaded a different
division of this Court, in Connolley v. BuZzt5-that the contractor was unable to limit his liability by express warranties
and/or disclaimers, and that buyers had more opportunities
to inspect-were rejected. Instead, the court brought in considerations from a New Jersey case, Schipper v. Levitt, & Sons,
Inc. 16 to the effect that buying a house from an advertised
model entails as much reliance upon the developer's skill as
when a car is bought, that there is no meaningful inspection
by the average purchaser, and that injuries from the defect
can best be borne by the contractor.
Kriegler was decided early enough in 1969, for several other
districts of the Courts of Appeal to apply it. The second district did so in Avner v. Langridge Estates/ 7 extending Kriegler
in two directions. The first direction was with regard to the
product claimed defective, since here it was soil rather than a
Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d
1049 (1963). This doctrine represents
a significant advance over the earlier
"warranty" remedy of purchasers, since
the niceties of the sales law do not have
to be complied with by the plaintiff, and
the defendant is unable to exculpate
himself by contract.
12. See, e.g. Gustafson v. Dunman,
Inc., 204 Cal. App.2d 10, 22 Cal. Rptr.
161 (1962). See generally, Dunham,
Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of
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Land for a Particular Purpose, 37 Minn
L. Rev. 108 (1953).
13. Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App.
2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1968).
14. 269 Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1969).

15. 258 Cal. App.2d 183, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 689 (1968).

16. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
17. 272 Cal. App.2d 607, 695, 77
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970

I
I

Real Property

house; instead of putting in a poor heating system, the defendant put in poor fill, on which he then built a house. There
were some tenable distinctions to be made between manufacturing houses and working with soil, but the Court held that
modern earth-moving and testing techniques made the distinctions irrelevant.
The other direction of extension over Kriegler was less
obvious but more important. In Kriegler, a great deal of significance was put on the fact that Eichler was "mass producing" houses: 18
We think, in terms of today's society, there are no meaningful distinctions between Eichler's mass production
and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of
automobiles and that the pertinent overriding policy
considerations are the same. 19
If strict liability were going to be imposed in the mass produc-

tion field alone, it might help people who bought Eichler or
Levitt homes, but what about all those houses built and sold
by the many little contractors who come into and out of the
real estate market so rapidly?20
In A vner, the defendant plainly graded more than one
lot, but the Court gave no indication at all of how many lots.
Kriegler was described and quoted, the fact of 4,000 homes
was mentioned, but nothing was said about the number of
homes this defendant built.
It makes sense not to confine the rule to the big contractors.
Buyers are as unable to inspect homes built by little contractors as big ones; they are forced to rely as much on the builder's expertise in either case, and there is no reason why big
but not little contractors should bear the loss of their defects.
It is possible that our Supreme Court, which has not yet
passed on this question, will outlaw the application of strict
18. Over 4,000 homes had radiant
heating systems like the one involved
in this case.
19. 269 Cal. App.2d 224 at 227, 74
Cal. Rptr. 749 at 752 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970

20. See Note, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects
in New Housing, 35 U. Chic. L. Rev.
739 (1968).
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liability to the real estate field. But this seems hardly probable
in light of the way that the Courts of Appeal have been deciding this precise question, and in light of the way the Supreme
Court has extended the concepts of strict liability in the chattel field and general liability in the real estate field.
If strict liability now applies to real estate contractors,
and if invitees can now recover from contractors for negligence, it is hard to see why the courts will limit application
of the theory to cases where the plaintiff is an owner and reject
it where he is an invitee, in light of Rowland v. Christian l and
Elmore v. American Motors Corp.2 But the question does
remain whether this theory-in real estate at least-can do
more than justify an award to an owner or guest for property
damage caused by the property defect. Will personal injuries
also be compensable?

c.

Measure of Damages

In the chattel field, there is little question but that a person
injured by a defective product can recover for both the cost
of the damage to the product and for his own personal injuries.
Since so many harm-producing chattels cost infinitesimally
less than the amount of harm they do, not much attention is
usually paid to compensation for loss to the product itself.3
In real estate, the situation is often reversed; a defective heating system may cause only $10 worth of bodily injuries while
requiring several thousand dollars to repair if it is built into
the basic structure of the house. Thus there are at least as
many cases going to court where the home owner is seeking
the cost of repairs (or depreciation of property value) as where
he is claiming for personal injuries.
Both Kriegler v. Eichler4 and Avner v. Longridge Estates/
1. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968).
2. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652,
451 P.2d 84 (1969).
3. Does anyone really know, or care,
for instance, whether the plaintiff in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
396

N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), also

wanted to recover the cost of the tire?
4. 269 Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1969).
S. 272 Cal. App.2d 607, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1969).
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the two strict-liability real estate cases in California, involved
property damage only. So did Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan,s now the main California case involving thirdparty liability. If the next defect in a house causes more serious personal injuries than property damage, will the injured
party be able to recover for these?
The contractor negligence cases have been rather indifferent to the kind of loss involved. Hale v. Depaolf and
Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co. s both gave personal injury awards
against contractors for defective conditions. But the next
Supreme Court case, Stewart v. COX,9 used precisely the same
logic to justify an award for properly damage (in the amount
of $25,000) resulting from a defective swimming pool. The
case could apparently have involved a drowning as easily as
water leakage. Finally, in Sabella v. Wisler/ o where another
property damage award was upheld, the Supreme Court did
observe that negligence by the contractor would permit a
recovery for either personal injuries or property damage.
But it may be one thing to say that negligence permits recovery for either damage and another to say that a recovery
in strict liability can include whatever loss results. l l However, reverting to the chattel field, the Supreme Court has told
us that bodily and property damage are both compensable
under a theory of strict liability.
Plaintiff contends that, even though the law of warranty
governs the economic relations between the parties, the
doctrine of strict liability in tort should be extended to
govern physical injury to plaintiff's property, as well as
personal injury. We agree with this contention. Phys6. 69 Ca1.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369,
447 P.2d 609 (1968). See section II D
infra.
7. 33 Cal.2d 228, 201 P.2d 1, 13
A.L.R.2d 183 (1948).
8. 49 Cal.2d 720, 321
(1958).

P.2d 736

9. 55 Cal.2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521,
362 P.2d 345 (1961).
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10. 59 Cal.2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689,
377 P.2d 889 (1963).
11. On the other hand, it is probable
that, on the basis of the four cases just
mentioned and those discussed in section IIA, supra, a contractor who is negligent may be liable both to the owner
for property damage and to the invitee
for personal injuries.
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ical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that
there is no reason for distinguishing them. 12
And in the New Jersey case of Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc.,13 under a strict liability theory, a tenant in a home purchased from the builder was allowed to recover for personal
injuries caused to his child by a defective hot water heater.
There was no discussion at all of the question of whether the
contractor's strict liability was limited to property damage.
Schipper v. Levitt is important in California, not only because
it has been cited with approval in three cases,14 but also because
it itself was based in large part on the California decisions
of Dow v. Holly Mfg. CO. 15 and Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products,lnc. 16
These three considerations: (a) that contractors are liable
for personal and property damage when negligent; (b) that
suppliers of chattels are liable for both kinds of loss under a
strict liability theory; and (c) that contractors are now held
strictly liable for defective houses, make it almost inevitable
that the damages recovered from contractors under a theory
of strict liability will not be limited to property losses. Nor
in light of Rowland v. Christian l7 and Elmore v. American
Motors Corp.18 will recoveries for personal injuries based on
a strict liability theory be confined to home owners, tenants,
or other possessors of land; even invitees will collect. The
question remaining is whether these plaintiffs can recover
such damages under a strict liability theory when a thirdparty lender is the defendant.
12. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Ca1.2d 9, 18, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24, 403
P.2d 145, 151 (1965). The reference to
"economic relations" referred to the
plaintiff's claim for lost profits. The
court held he could recover only on a
warranty theory for them.
13. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
14. Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan, 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968),
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. 269
398

Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr.
749 (1969), Avner v. Longridge Estates,
272 Cal. App.2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1969).
15. 49 Cal.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736
(1958).
16. 59 Ca1.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963).
17. 69 Cal.2d 108,70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968).
18. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652,
451 P.2d 84 (1969).
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D. Parties Defendant
In order to be held liable for a defect in property, a third
party need not necessarily have himself caused the condition
to exist. Third parties aware of adverse information concerning the property may have a duty to disclose such facts to
prospective purchasers, or sometimes may even have a duty to
discover these conditions when specially employed to do so.
Thus termite inspectors, soil engineers, and surveyors have
been held liable for misrepresentation, nondisclosure, or negligent misrepresentation to purchasers who relied on their skill
and/or knowledge. 19 Lenders, too, have been held liable to
purchasers for misstatements.~o Generally these cases sdund
in fraud, which carries, as a special measure of damages, the
difference between the price paid and the value of the property, l but the duty to warn may be treated as a duty of care2
with the result that personal injuries become compensable
under a negligence theory.3
In addition to fraud/negligence liability based on failure to warn, third parties may also be found liable under
two other theories. On the one hand, they may be held liable
under a rule of imputed liability, being charged with responsibility for what someone else did or did not do. Or, on the
other hand, they may be charged with a duty of their own to
take steps to avoid the creation of a defective condition, even
though the condition was not brought about by their "direct"
acts. Both of these latter theories underwent great expansion
in 1969, when applied to real estate lending institutions. In
two cases, decided on the same day, the State Supreme Court
put the lending industry into a state of shock.
19. See e.g. Gagne v. Bertran, 43
Cal.2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Wice
v. Schilling, 124 Cal. App.2d 735, 269
P.2d 231 (1954); Roberts v. Karr, 178
Cal. App.2d 535, 3 Cal. Rptr. 98
(1960); Greenberg v. Hastie, 202 Cal.
App.2d 159, 20 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1962);
Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App.2d
218, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962); McCauley v. Dennis, 220 Cal. App.2d 627, 34
Cal. Rptr. 90 (1963).
CAL LAW 1970

20. See, e.g., De Zemplen v. Home
Federal Savings and Loan, 221 Cal.
App.2d 197, 34 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1963).
1. Civ. Code § 3343.
2. Not a duty to correct the defect,
but a duty to discover it and inform
the plaintiff about it.
3. See Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal.2d
552, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304
(1962).
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Morgan v. Reasor Corp.4 was one of these two cases.
There, the plaintiffs gave a contractor a note and deed of trust
to secure payment for a house he was to construct on their
land, and the contractor then transferred the paper to a finance
company. The plaintiffs sued both the contractor and the
finance company, claiming that the documents did not comply
with the Unruh Act,5 and they won.
The Supreme Court first held that a construction contract
came within the Unruh Act. Although a Court of Appeal
had earlier intimated that this might be the case,6 the real
estate industry had generally assumed that the Act did not
apply to it. The legislature promptly repealed this part of the
opinion by enacting Civil Code 1801.4,7 which eliminated
most construction contracts from the scope of the· Act. 8
For purposes of this article, that part of the holding was less
important than what the Supreme Court did next. The purchasers were asserting nonliability for any interest payments
against a finance company which claimed to be a holder in due
course. Would Unruh Act defenses apply? The answer was
yes, for two reasons. First, the Court held that the policy
of the Unruh Act compelled making an assignee of the paper
responsible for its assignor's violations of the Act so long as the
assignee had constructive notice of the violation. Second, and
more important, the Court restated a rule it had made long
earlier, that a finance company might be denied holder-in-due4. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398,
447 P.2d 638 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see McCall, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, in this volume.
S. Civil Code 1801 et. seq.
6. Mann v. Earls, 226 Cal. App.2d
155, 37 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1964).
7. The provisions of this chapter shall
not apply to any contract or series of
contracts providing for the construction,
sale, or construction and sale of an
entire residence or all or part of a structure designed for cOl!lmercial or industrial occupancy, with or without a parcel of real property or an interest there400

in, or for the sale of a lot or parcel of
real property, including any site preparation incidental to such sale. This act
is intended to abrogate any contrary
rule in Morgan v. Reasor Corp. 69 Cal.
2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 447 P2d 638
(1968).
8. Had this part of the decision not
been overturned, its sweep would have
been immense. It would probably have
applied to every sale in a real estate
development where the house was not
completed at the time the purchasers
agreed to buy.
CAL LAW 1970
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course status when it is so closely related to the seller/assignor
as to create an agency relationship between them. 9
The first argument may be ignored since it turns on the
Unruh Act, which now no longer applies to most real estate
transactions. But the second argument does not depend on
the Act and may have repercussions far beyond it. The Court
furnished a list of instances where the contractor might be
deemed the finance company's agent:
If Midwest (the finance company) had provided IBC
(the contractor) with forms for bills of sale or notes,
that conduct would strongly suggest the required expectation, but the record contains no showing of any such
arrangement. If Midwest had purchased a substantial
number of such notes from IBC in the past, that factor
too would weigh heavily, but plaintiffs do not establish
any such practice. If Midwest's name had been on the
note when the buyer signed it, or if Midwest had inquired
into the buyer's credit rating, such evidence would indicate that IBC contemplated Midwest's acquisition of
the note, but neither of these factors was present. If
IBC had assigned the note to Midwest on the day plaintiffs executed it, such assignment might have raised a
presumption as to IBC's expectations, but we know only
that IBC assigned the note within three months.lO

Many of these conditions fairly describe the relationship
between a savings and loan institution and the speculative
contractor developing a tract. Not only is the money for land
acquisition and construction advanced, but there is then an
arrangement between the parties for the handling of all purchase money loans on the individual houses. It is not even a
question of purchasing the individual notes and deeds of trust,
since they are made out in favor of the savings and loan association from the start. The Supreme Court has elsewhere
held that a savings and loan association and a developer
9. See Commercial Credit Corporation v. Orange County Machine Works,
34 Cal.2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
CAL LAW 1970

10. 69 Cal.2d 881 at 895,896, 73
Cal. Rptr. 398 at 407-408, 447 P.2d
638 at 647-648 (1968).
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are normally not Jomt venturers,ll but Morgan v. Reasor
Corp.12 seems to indicate strongly that they may be principal
and agent nevertheless.
All that Morgan held was that a finance company too close
to the contractor may be denied holder-in-due-course protection. But may it be affirmatively liable for damages for
defective construction? The practical difference between
these two issues is perhaps not as large as it seems. A purchaser who has a claim against his seller for some physical
condition of the property, and who also owes the seller money
for the balance of the price, may offset one against the other if
he is successful in court. 13 If that same offset can be asserted
against the lending institution on the ground that the seller
acted as agent for the lender, and if the extent of the damage
does not exceed the amount of the loan, the buyer needs no
further protection.
Defenses which the Court held applicable to the finance
company in Morgan were those relating to the contractor's
failure to comply with the Unruh Act in the preparation of the
contract documents. Can defenses relating to the contractor's work on the job also be charged to the lending institution
behind him? Nothing in the opinion indicated that the decision was intended to have a limited scope. One statement
the Court made is particularly interesting:
The important function of section 1812.7 becomes particularly apparent in the case of a seller inclined frequently to violate the act. We recognize that stringent
enforcement of section 1812.7 will tend to compel such
a retailer to sell his paper at a greater discount and to
charge a proportionately higher price for his goods.
In all likelihood, this increase in retail prices will deter
customers from dealing with such a seller. Moreover,
such enforcement will effectuate a proper allocation
of possible financial loss. The impact of the violations
U. See Connor v. Great Western
Savings and Loan Association, 69 Cal.
2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d
609 (1968), infra.
402

12. 69 AC. 919, 69 Cal.2d 881, 73
Cal. Rptr. 398, 447 P.2d 638 (1968).
13. Cf. Lenard v. Edmonds, 151 Cal.
App.2d 764, 312 P.2d 308 (1957).
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will be borne, not by a few consumers unable to pass on
the loss or in any way "insure" against the effect of a
harsh contract, but by finance companies that buy large
numbers of notes. Such financiers are obviously better
able than buyers to absorb the loss of an occasional bad
deal. Finally, strict enforcement will give finance companies with the knowledge and economic leverage required effectively to police against Unruh Act violations,
an incentive to do SO.14
Compare this to the language of the same Court a few years
earlier in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co./ 5 where a dealer
was held strictly liable along with the manufacturer for a defective vehicle.
Retailers, like manufacturers, are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the pUblic. They are an
integral part of the overall producing and marketing
enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting
from defective products . . . . In some cases the retailer may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases
the retailer himself may playa substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to
exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer's strict liability thus serves as an added incentive
to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured
plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they
can adjust the costs of such protection between them in
the course of their continuing business relationship.I6
The quotation from Vandermark manifestly invites consideration of whether Morgan v. Reason Corp.I7 may not only
be extended from Unruh Act violations to negligent construc14. 69 Cal.2d 881 at 889-891, 73
Cal. Rptr. 398 at 404, 447 P.2d 638
at 644 (1968).
15. 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896,
391 P.2d 168 (1964).
CAL LAW 1970

16. 61 Cal.2d 256 at 262, 263, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 at 899-900, 391 P.2d
168 at 171-172.
17. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398, 447 P.2d 638 (1968).
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tion but in fact even lead to the imposition of strict liability on
real estate construction lenders for defects in the finished
product. The tests of Vandermark appear to be better met
by the construction lender than by the automobile retailer:
( 1). The savings and loan industry is an integral part of
the manufacturing and marketing of houses. These institutions are far more indispensable to the real estate industry than
are finance companies in the automobile field. 18 They enter
the picture before construction begins (with their acquisition
and construction loans) and stay there long after it is completed (with their home purchase-money loans).
(2). Real estate lending institutions are often the only
member of the home-producing enterprise reasonably available
to injured plaintiffs. As has already been pointed out, contractors are not like automobile manufacturers, but flourish in
far greater numbers, on a more petty and transient basis.
(3). Savings and loans can play a substantial part in
insuring that the finished product-the house-is safe. Unlike
finance companies, they are more concerned with the value
of the product than with the plant and assets of the manufacturer,19 particularly in California, because of the antideficiency
laws. Unlike automobile dealers, they are there at the beginning of construction, at least when a construction loan is made.
The terms of their loan agreements permit them to supervise
construction, and withhold progress payments when it is not to
their satisfaction.20 They maintain their own staff of experts,
often more diligent than municipal building inspectors.
( 4 ). These institutions can easily adjust the cost of protection with the contractor merely by requiring insurance or the
posting of a bond.
One obstacle to applying the Vandermark doctrine of vicari18. See Lefcoe and Dobson, Savings
Associations as Land Developers, 75
Yale L.J. 1271 (1966).
19. See Note, Torts-Lender's Tortious Liability for Building Defects,
1968 Wise. L. Rev. 600.
20. See Note, Torts-Building and
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Housing Project Developed by an Inexperienced, Undercapitalized Builder
is Under a duty to Protect Home Buyers in the Project from Major Structural
Defects. 37 U. Cine. L. Rev. 219,
(1968 ).
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ous strict liability to the savings and loan institution is that
nowhere in California has a finance company been held strictly
liable in the chattel field. Vandermark involved a dealer, and
distinctions can be made between dealers and finance companies. But even if such distinctions will work in the chattel
field, it is unlikely to work in the real estate field in light of
the Supreme Court's companion decision to Morgan, Connor
v. Great Western Savings and Loan. l
In Connor, an inexperienced and undercapitalized contractor worked out a scheme to build and sell 2,000 homes in
Southern California. To finance the plan, he worked out an
arrangement with Great Western Savings & Loan whereby
it was to purchase part of the land and warehouse it for him
until he could pay for it out of the loans it made to him. Great
Western profited from a markup on the resale and from the
fact that all construction and ultimate purchase-money loans
had to be made by it. The only drawback to the arrangement
was that it left the contractor with so little money that he was
forced to cut dangerous corners in construction.
One such corner was soil conditions. The houses were
built on adobe soil, which can expand five times when wet
and therefore requires special construction techniques which,
sadly, were not employed. The result was inevitable: purchasers found their homes cracking, and sued. They sued not
only the contractor, but also Great Western.
The purchasers were nonsuited in the trial court, but had
much better luck at the appellate level. The Court of Appeal
held, in 1967, that Great Western had a duty to the purchasers
to protect them from defective construction because it had
undertaken to provide almost total financing to a bad-risk
contractor. 2 The Supreme Court also held Great Western
1. 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369,
447 P.2d 609 (1968). "Companion" is
perhaps too strong. Both cases were
decided on the same day and stand next
to each other in the reports. Curiously
enough, however, neither refers to the
other.
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2. Connor v. Conejo Valley Development Co. and Burgess v. Conejo Valley
Development Co. 61 Cal. Rptr. 333
(1967).
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liable, less for its near-total financing than for the enthusiastic
role it played in the project.
In undertaking these relationships, Great Western became much more than a lender content to lend money
at interest on the security of real property. It became
an active participant in a home construction enterprise
. . . . Its financing, which made the enterprise possible, took on ramifications beyond the domain of the
usual money lender. It received not only interest on its
construction loans, but also substantial fees for making
them, a 20 percent capital gain for "warehousing" the
land, and protection from loss of profits in the event individual home buyers sought permanent financing elsewhere.
Great Western was held to be under a duty to its own shareholders to avoid construction of defective homes; it was held
to have breached that duty through careless inspections; and
that breach was held to make it liable to the purchasers of the
homes even though there was no privity between them.
One paragraph of the opinion is particularly significant because it echoes so much the logic of Vandermark when that
case extended strict liability to the third parties:
By all the foregoing tests, Great Western had a duty to
exercise reasonable care to prevent the construction and
sale of seriously defective homes to plaintiffs. The countervailing considerations invoked by Great Western and
amici curiae are that the imposition of the duty in question upon a lender will increase housing costs, drive marginal builders out of business, and decrease total housing
at a time of great need. These are conjectural claims.
In any event, there is no enduring social utility in fostering the construction of seriously defective homes. If reliable construction is the norm, the recognition of a duty
on the part of tract financiers to home buyers should not
materially increase the cost of housing or drive small
3. 69 Cal.2d 850, 864, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369, 376, 447 P.2d 609, 616.
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builders out of business. If existing sanctions are inadequate, imposition of a duty at the point of effective financial control of tract building will insure responsible building practices. Moreover, in either event the losses of
family savings invested in seriously defective homes
would be devastating economic blows if no redress were
available. 4
Were Connor the last work on the subject to date, the future
would have been fairly clear. The similarity between the Connor and Vandermark policies is great enough to argue that
strict liability would replace negligence as the basis of liability
since the policing of the construction industry can be accomplished more effectively thereby. The distinction between
property damage and personal injuries would not last long, in
light of the way strict liability developed in the chattel field
and negligence grew in the real estate field, so that a buyer
who suffered personal injuries from the defect could also recover from the construction lender. In light of Rowland v.
Christian 5 and Elmore v. American Motors,6 invitees would
also soon be able to recover for harm done to them. And
finally, with Morgan v. Reasor Corp.7 as a basis, savings and
loan institutions would be subject to liability even when they
had not engaged in "lending plus," as had Great Western, but
had merely made a regular construction loan to a developer.8
This last prediction, however, appears to have been demolished by the action of the legislature in its quick enactment
of Civil Code section 3434: 9
A lender who makes a loan of money, the proceeds of
which are used or may be used by the borrower to finance
the design, manufacture, construction, repair, modification or improvement of real or personal property for sale
or lease to others, shall not be held liable to third persons
4. 69 Cal.2d 850, 867-868, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 378, 447 P.2d 609, 618.
5. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968).
6. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652,
451 P.2d 84 (1969).
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7. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398,
447 P.2d 638 (1968).
8. But see Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal.
App.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
9. Stats 1969, Ch. 1584, § I.
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for any loss or damage occasioned by any defect in the
real or personal property so designed, manufactured,
constructed, repaired, modified or improved or for any
loss or damage resulting from the failure of the borrower
to use due care in the design, manufacture, construction,
repair, modification or improvement of such real or personal property, unless such loss or damage is a result
of an act of the lender outside the scope of the activities
of a lender of money or unless the lender has been a party
to misrepresentations with respect to such real or personal property.
Unlike the partial repeal of Morgan v. Reasor Corp.l0 by
section 1801.4, section 3434, does not abrogate any part of
the Connor holding or abolish any previous judicial rules
concerning lenders. Lenders are still liable when they exceed
their traditional functions or when they engage in fraud. But
merely by limiting Connor to its facts, the legislature has
worked a far greater limitation here than it did in repealing
Morgan. It was inevitable that had section 3434, not been
enacted, the courts would soon have forgotten the fact that
the savings and loan association in Connor had gone beyond
a lender's normal role, because it was in fact irrelevant to the
holding. Probably the main justification for imposing on
lending institutions responsibility for carelessly inspecting their
projects is the fact that they normally inspect them anyway.
Even when the lender stays entirely within its normal bounds,
it will be concerned-for the preservation of the security for
its loan-with the quality of the job. l l Thus its responsibility,
and duty, is no greater in one case than the other. Just as
the mass-production test of strict liability for contractors will
vanish because in fact it has nothing to do with the real issues
involved, so too would the excesses of the construction lender.
Nothing in section 3434, prohibits the development of strict
liability, or the protection of invitees, or the recovery for per10. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398, 447 P.2d 638 (1968).
U. This is disputed by the lending
industry. See Pfeiler, Lender's Liability
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in Tract Financing, U.S.S. & L. Bull.,
85 (Mar., 1969); but see TortsLender's T ortiolls Liability tor Bllilding Defects, 1968 Wise. L. Rev. 600.
CAL LAW 1970

Real Property

sonal injuries in the real estate field. But by limiting the
lender's liability to cases where it does more than lend money,
these other developments look better on paper than in reality.
A judgment in favor of a guest in a strict liability case for his
injuries against a defunct contractor is not the goal of most
attorneys. And, even apart from the threat of section 3434,
lending institutions are not-in the foreseeable future- going
to move out of the lending arena and into the development
field. Connor was a product of the plentiful money situation
a few years back when the financial industry was almost forced
into participation in development with speculators in order
to rid themselves of the great reserves of cash coming into their
coffers. The prospect today of inducing a savings and loan
association into participating in a speculative development is
virtually nonexistent.
It is too bad that the legislature cut off the opportunity
for the courts to develop a scheme of adequate protection for
owners and users of homes. It means that again the growth
of protection in the real estate field will lag behind that developing for every other product. The statute may have been
the result of visions by the lending industry of enormous new
liabilities confronting them. But these fears were hardly that
legitimate. No one expected lender's liability to reach every
trivial defect in a house, but only those which a reasonable
inspection might have uncovered. 12 Asking lenders to make
reasonable inspections when they presumably are doing so
anyway does not appear to create any costly new duties. And
even if it does entail some expense (by way of higher interest),
it is an expense most of the public will be glad to bear as payment for the protection an expanded liability would afford
them.
12. See Lefcoe and Dobson, Savings
Associations as Land Developers, 75
Yale L.J. 1271 (1966).
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In.

Brokers and Their Commissions
A. Listings

The 1968 California Real Estate Association Exclusive
Listing Form ("Exclusive Authorization and Right to Sell")
provides that the listing broker will receive --% of the
selling price if the property is sold during the listing period,
or --% of the asking price if during that period the property is withdrawn from sale, transferred, conveyed or leased
without the consent of the broker, or if the vendor voluntarily
made the title "marketable."13 This is not the only way this
clause could have been worded. The San Francisco Real Estate Board Multiple Listing Form, for instance, differs in two
respects: by using only the selling price as the measure of
compensation and by adding that a commission is also payable
if the broker's authority is revoked during the period.
Several 1969 cases illustrate how important such textual
variations may be. Although both forms provide equal and
ample protection to the broker when the owner bypasses him
in a sale of the property while a listing is in effect,14 problems
arise if something other than a sale occurs. In Al Herd,
Inc. v. Isaac/ 5 the broker used a Los Angeles listing agreement
similar to the San Francisco form, and during the listing period the owner leased the property to a party originally contacted by the broker. Since the listing provided for payment
of a commission in the event of withdrawal, transfer, or lease
by the owner, it did not matter that the broker himself was
never authorized to lease the property-he was still entitled to
a commission. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's decision against the broker. But since the form
based the commission on the selling price, it was necessary
to remand the case to decide whether a commission should be
measured by the listing price, the value of the lease, or the cus13. Undoubtedly, "unmarketable" was
intended.
14. See Berzon v. U.L.C. Corp. 274
Cal. App. 2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr. 277
(1969).
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15. 271 Cal. App.2d 749, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1969).

CAL LAW 1970

Real Property

tomary commission in such cases. Had the parties used the
CREA form instead, the broker would have been simply entitled to a percentage of the listing price regardless of the value
of the lease or custom.
On the other hand, a drawback of the CREA form was
revealed in Never v. King/ 6 where a loan broker's authority
was prematurely revoked. His listing was similar to the
CREA form in that it did not make a commission specifically
payable on revocation. As a result, the Court of Appeal rejected the broker's claim for a commission and declared that
he could recover only those damages he could actually prove. 17
Earlier cases awarding a full commission after revocation were
distinguished because the listing agreements there had so provided. Thus, here, had the San Francisco version been
used, the broker's claim would have been measurably stronger,
although the language of the opinion was such that the possibility is real that these older cases may no longer be followed.
B. Deposit Receipts

As if brokers did not have enough commISSIon problems
under the standard listing forms, they go farther and create
new problems by signing deposit receipts that radically affect
the amount of compensation to be paid in certain circumstances. IS Barton v. White Oak Realty, Inc. I9 is a good example.
To understand Barton, one must understand a vendor's
rights against a defaulting purchaser under a deposit receipt.
If a purchaser defaults and the vendor resells elsewhere for a
higher price, the purchaser may have restitution of his downpayment, less any amount actually paid by the vendor to the
16. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 81 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (1969).
17. None were.
18. The new deposit form of the
California Real Estate Association states
that the broker can collect "one half
that portion of the damages collected
CAL LAW 1970

. . ." by the vendor. The older
form provided that the broker could
collect one-half the forfeited deposit.
19. 271 Cal. App.2d 579, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 587 (1969). For further discussion of this case, see York, REMEDIES,
in this volume.
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broker handling the aborted sale. 20 But under Royer v.
Carter/ if there is no profitable resale, and the vendor sues
the purchaser for damages for breach of contract, one item
of special damages he may recover is the difference between:
( 1) the expenses he would have incurred had he resold the
property at its market value on the date of breach; and (2) any
expenses he was saved from incurring when the original sale
failed. 2
Barton showed that the Royer rule of vendor's damages also
bears on the broker's right to recover his commission after a
default. Here the defaulting purchaser sued to recover her
deposit, the vendor cross-complained for damages, and the
brokers also cross-complained against the purchaser for their
full commission. The trial court denied restitution to the purchaser, awarded difference value damages to the vendor, and
held the purchaser liable to the brokers for their commission.
The brokers' theory was as follows: (1) by suing the purchaser for damages, the vendor becomes automatically liable
to the broker for a full commission; (2) since the vendor is
obligated for a commission to the broker, he can recover that
much from the purchaser; (3) since the vendor owes the broker and the purchaser owes the vendor the same amount, the
broker can go directly against the purchaser for his commission.
The Court of Appeal found this theory wrong in two respects. First, it proceeded on the false premise that the vendor
could recover the full commission from the purchaser whenever he was liable for it to the broker. Since Royer v. Cartera
gives the purchaser the expenses of a hypothetical second sale
less the savings of real expenses from the first sale, it cannot be
maintained that the vendor can sue his purchaser for the actual
expenses of the first sale. 4
20. See Freedman v. The Rector, 37
Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d
1 (195\).
1. 37 Cal.2d 544, 233 P.2d 539
(1951).
2. Such as paying the broker only
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half of the deposit instead of the full
commission.
3. 37 Cal.2d 544, 233 P.2d 539
(195\).
4. Under the Royer formula, a vendor liable for the full commission to
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If the second premise of the broker's theory is wrong (be-

cause a vendor cannot recover from the purchaser what he
owes the broker), then the first premise also fails. Since a
vendor's recovery from the purchaser is reduced by whatever
savings he makes on first-sale expenses, it cannot be held that
he becomes liable for all first-sale expenses the moment he sues
the purchaser, because such full liability would automatically
eliminate any possibility of a saving. In other words, whether
the vendor is liable for a full commission after an aborted sale
may depend on his contract with the broker, but it does not
depend on whether or not he sues the purchaser. Precisely
because the extent of the purchaser's liability to the vendor
depends on the extent of the vendor's liability to the broker,
the extent of that liability to the broker cannot (circularly)
depend on the purchaser's liability to the vendor. The question of liability to the broker must be determined independently.5
However, this rejected circularity is exactly what the new
CREA deposit receipt attempts to introduce into the picture.
The listing agreement gives the broker a fraction of the selling
price, and there is no adjustment for an aborted sale. The
older forms of deposit receipt modified this to give the broker
a share of the forfeited deposit. But the new form gives the
broker one-half of the damages collected by the vendor from
the purchaser. This is an impossible number. The vendor's
recovery from the purchaser depends indirectly on his liability to the broker (under Royer v. Carter),6 but now the
vendor's liability to the broker (under the new deposit receipt)
will depend on how much he recovers from the purchaser. Not
even a computer could work this out. Brokers would be far
better off not signing deposit receipts and staying with their
listing agreements.
the broker, even though the sale failed,
would have no savings from the sale
that could be offset against the hypothetical expenses of the resale. But that
is not the same as giving him the real
expenses of the first sale.
5. The third premise of the broker's
theory was not examined and may be
CAL LAW 1970

valid, but only to the extent that it is
first determined how much the vendor
owes the broker and then shown that
this amount does not exceed the extent
of liability of the purchaser to the vendor.
6. 37 Cal.2d 544, 233 P.2d 539
(1951).
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IV. Landlord and Tenant

In two decisions this year, the State Supreme Court undertook exhaustive analysis of some problems commonly faced by
landlords and tenants.
A. Repairs
The first case, Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v.
Loverde,7 involved an argument between a landlord and a
tenantS as to which had to pay the cost of alterations required
to bring the premises up to Code. The landlord had some
lease clauses in his favor, but the tenant was unwilling to do
the work in light of the fact that it would cost $7500 when
he had only eleven months remaining on his three-year lease
at $600 rent per month. The Supreme Court held that a
landlord is responsible for such costs except in three situations: first, the tenant has the duty to make small repairs
arising from his ordinary use of the premises (similar to the
common-law duty to avoid waste); second, the tenant must
bear the entire cost of making the premises conform to Code
when it is his new use of the premises which subjects them
to hitherto inapplicable Code requirements; third, the tenant
must bear the cost when he covenants to do so in his lease.
All three exceptions are new since there has been almost no
litigation in California on this matter, but the third exception
is obviously the most important, since it may tell landlords
how to draft printed form leases for maximum protection.
On the issue of drafting, the Court first held that a provision merely promising compliance to all laws by the tenant
does not compel him to do "substantial" curative work. A
Court of Appeal had previously reached a similar result in
Browning v. Aymard,9 stating that such a covenant did not
require the tenant to do any rebuilding or building of a new
facility. But the Supreme Court did not utilize the rebuilding/
repair test. "Substantial" went consciously undefined, al7. 70 Cal.2d 666, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889,
451 P.2d 721 (1969).
8. Actually a tenant and subtenant.
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Rptr 604 (1964).
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though a footnote indicated that the word usually serves as a
conclusionary label for considerations such as the cost of the
work (compared to the rent), the length of the lease, the beneficiary of the improvement, the extent to which the work will
interfere with the tenant's enjoyment of the premises, and
whether the parties contemplated the matter. The Court was
careful, however, to avoid indicating whether these· tests will
be the ones applied when such a covenant to comply is the
only relevant clause in the lease. 1o
In this case, however, there was no need to stop with the
covenant to comply. The Court held there were enough other
factors present to permit shifting the risk for the required work
to the tenant. The additional factors were: ( 1) an "as is"
clause in the lease; (2) another clause relieving the landlord
of any duty to repair or maintain the improvements; (3) a
third clause compelling the tenant to assume all risks of injury
by virtue of his use of the premises and to indemnify the landlord in this respect; (4) the character of the premises; (5)
the testimony of the parties.
The last two factors were not stated very persuasively by
the Court, which may make them all the more significant.
They may well have been included to keep landlords from
thinking that they need only amplify their covenant-to-comply
language to include the other three clauses in order to make
tenants responsible for everything. When that is the case, the
Court may hold that by virtue of the nature of the premises
(e.g. a single apartment in a large building) or the parol evidence offered (e.g. that the landlord made promises to repair
some defect), the language is not effective to make the tenant
bear the costs of expensive work required by the city or county.
Another related question not discussed by the Court is
whether a landlord will be liable for personal injuries caused
to third persons by uncorrected code violations. In Finnegan
v. Royal Realty, 11 the Supreme Court held that a land10. Query: Would the tests then be
obviated by a covenant to comply that
states that "substantial" repairs were
also included?
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11. 35 Cal.2d 409, 218 P.2d
(1950).
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lord has a nondelegable duty in tort to comply with the Code.
Although Glenn Sewell shows that the duty is obviously delegable as a matter of contract, it is doubtful whether this would
be a defense in tort when invitees are injured. 12 It is also
doubtful that Glenn Sewell has overruled Finnegan. More
likely is the possibility that Finnegan has been modified sub
silentio by Rowland v. Christian/ 3 so that a covenant between·
landlord and tenant will be held to be merely evidence bearing
on the question of a landlord's negligence.
If the Supreme Court has second thoughts about Glenn
Sewell later, it will be easy to keep the holding of the case
narrow. It does not say that the landlord may compel a tenant
to make an improvement. All the.case really "holds" is that a
tenant may not abandon the premises and be excused from the
rent when a local authority orders that operations cease unless
changes in the premises are made.
B. Forcible Entry

The other important case, Daluiso v. Boone,14 did not even
involve a landlord and tenant, but undoubtedly will have its
greatest effect on these parties. There one landowner forcibly
tore down his neighbor's encroaching fence, causing the neighbor to have a heart attack. Preexisting case law gave the
stricken neighbor two options. He could bring a statutory
action for forcible entry, in which event he would merely have
to prove that he was in peaceable possession and that the defendant used some "force" to enter (the amount would be
irrelevant), but his recovery would not cover his heart attack.
Or he could sue in tort, and recover for his emotional distress,15 but he would have to prove either that the defendant
lacked title or the right of possession to the fence, (e. g. that
12. Of course, the tenant may have to
indemnify the landlord in such a case,
but that will not help very much if the
tenant is judgment-proof.
13. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968). See section
IIA, supra. Also see Connor v. Great
Western Savings and Loan Association,
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69 Ca1.2d 887, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447
P.2d 609 (1968).
14. 71 Ca1.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr. 707,
455 P.2d 811 (1969).
15. See Richardson v. Pridmore, 97
Cal. App.2d 124, 217 P .2d 113, 17
A.L.R.2d 929 (1950).
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plaintiff was not only in peaceable but also rightful possession)
or that defendant's force was excessive (unreasonable). In
other words, title plus reasonable force was a defense to a
nonstatutory tort action.
The problem in Daluiso, that of forcible entry, is frequently
faced by the legal aid lawyer in representing a tenant who has
been locked out because of nonpayment of rent. He has no
trouble proving that the lockout is a forcible entry,16 but he
can recover no real damages by suing in forcible entry and
detainer. The tenant's main injury, the mental distress which
comes from suddenly being without a place to live, is not
recoverable in a statutory action. 17 The closest the tenant can
come to this kind of recovery is through a prayer for punitive
damages. IS There is the possibility of getting something by
way of treble damages under the Code of Civil Procedure section 1174, but it is only the actual statutory damages that can
be trebled, and they rarely exist. 19 For these reasons, the tenant's attorney may choose to file a nonstatutory tort action instead, but then he immediately runs into the problem that the
tenant's default on the rent gave the landlord a right of possession under the lease. Therefore, no tort was committed unless excessive force was used, and a lockout rarely entails excessive force.
In Daluiso, the Supreme Court ended the harshness of the
plaintiff's choice by eliminating the restrictions applicable to
one of his options. It held that a plaintiff bringing a nonstatutory tort action need not prove that his possession was rightful; that is, that title is no defense for the use of force, even
when it is not excessive. Thus the plaintiff was allowed to
recover for his heart attack.
16. See Jordan v. Talbot; 55 Cal.2d
597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20, 6
A.L.R.3d 161 (1961), and Lamey v.
Mascriotra, 273 A.c.A. 767, 273 Cal.
App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1969).
17. See Anderson v. Taylor, 56 Cal.
131, 38 Am. R. 52 (1880).
18. See Wilkinson v. Singh, 93 Cal.
App. 337, 269 P. 705 (1928).
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19. While it is true that the tenant
is entitled to rent for the time that he
is out of possession, he also owes the
landlord rent for the same period. The
two will almost always offset each other. Karp v. Margolis, 159 Cal. App.2d
69, 323 P.2d 557 (1958).
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This result is less remarkable than the way in which it was
reached. There were two ways by which a peaceable, albeit
wrongful possessor, could be given pain and suffering damages. The Court here chose the hard way, by saying that they
are recoverable in a nonstatutory action, thereby overturning
the old rule that title was a defense. The easy way would have
been to hold that pain and suffering are recoverable in a statutory forcible entry and detainer action, because there is nothing in the forcible entry statute limiting the plaintiff's damages
in any fashion. 20 Anderson v. Taylor,l (quoted in Daluiso)
held that a plaintiff may recover under the statute for all damages which are the natural and proximate result of a forcible
entry. 2 Anderson then went on to hold, without any reasons
at all, that bodily and mental pain were not the natural and
proximate result of a forcible entry. The Supreme Court in
Daluiso could then have said merely that the pain may not
have been a natural and proximate result in Anderson, but
that when it was proven to have resulted from the entry, it
would be recoverable. Instead of having to overrule two
earlier cases,3 it could merely have reinterpreted one earlier
case. 4
Indeed, this might have been even more beneficial for plaintiffs, since the award could then have been trebled if the entry
were wanton or malicious. 5
Perhaps the reason for choosing the "harder" way to reach
this result was the opportunity it gave to the Court to make
a different argument. The Court's reason for rejecting title
as a defense to a nonstatutory action was that the legislative
policy against forcible entry should be judicially aided by
20. Compare Code of Civ. Proc. §§
1159 et. seq., especially § 1174.
1. 56 Cal. 131, 38 Am R. 52 (1880).
2. "The damages occasioned to the
plaintiff spoken of in the statute as authorized to be assessed, are such only
as are the natural and proximate result
of the forcible entry or forcible or unlawful detainer, as the case may be."
56 Cal. 131 at 132.
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3. Canavan v. Gray, 64 Cal. 5, 27
P. 788 (1883). Walker v. Chanslor, 153
Cal. 118, 94 P. 606, 126 A.S. 61, 17
Lns 455 (1908).
4. Anderson v. Taylor, 56 Cal. 131,
(1880), 38 Am. R. 52.
5. See San Francisco & Suburban
Home Building Society v. Leonard, 17
Cal. App. 254, 119 P. 405 (1911).
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treating such an entry as a wrong (i.e., a trespass) in all
cases, whether statutory or nonstatutory. The earlier rule that
the legislative remedy (a statutory action) was exclusive was
overruled because its application frustrated the legislative policy against forcible entries.
Thus two rules emerge from Daluiso. One rule is that title
is not a defense in a nonstatutory action. But the other rulethat the creation of a legislative remedy for forcible entry
does not preclude broader judicial remedies-may be more
important. For elsewhere in the landlord-tenant field, the existence of sections 1941 and 1942 of the Civil Code have long
stood as the major obstacle to tenants' attempts to correct slum
housing conditions. Section 1941 declares that a landlord
must keep dwellings in a condition for occupancy. But section 1942 declares that the tenant may leave, or spend up to
one month's rent to make such repairs, if the landlord fails
to do so. Our courts have traditionally held that the remedies
under 1942 are the exclusive relief for violations of 1941. 6
The Daluiso logic now permits an inference that this may
no longer be the case. If the legislative policy against selfhelp evictions may be augmented by judicial tort actions, may
it not also be held that the legislative policy against unsanitary
housing may be judicially aided in a similar fashion? Just as
the Supreme Court said in Daluiso that liberal interpretation
of the remedy provision of the Code is not the only way to
further a legislative policy against the legislative wrong, may
not the same be said when the legislative wrong is slum
housing?
Of course, merely holding that a tenant has other remedies
for violations of section 1941 than are prescribed in section
1942, will do little for most tenants. Standard form leases
are notorious for their provisions compelling tenants to waive
their rights under these two sections, and if tenants may validly
waive their rights under Civil Code 1941, it does not matter
much that they could otherwise have had relief not mentioned
6. See, e.g., Gately v. Campbell, 124
Cal. 520, 57 P. 567 (1899).
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in section 1942. Until our courts conclude that the right to
sanitary housing, like the right to peaceful possession, cannot
be waived,7 tenants' attacks on slum housing will be a losing
battle.
7. Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Ca1.2d 597,
12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20 (1961).
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